On  Dec. 2, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta made extensive remarks about  Iran to the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center. The following are  excerpts. 
        Iran’s  continued drive to develop nuclear capabilities, including troubling  enrichment activities and past work on weaponization that has now been  documented by the IAEA, and its continued support to groups like  Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations make clear that the  regime in Tehran remains a very grave threat to all of us…        
       Iran  must ultimately realize that its quest for nuclear weapons will make it  less, not more, secure.  These efforts are increasing Tehran’s  isolation and I continue to believe that pressure – economic pressure,  diplomatic pressure – and strengthened collective defenses are the right  approach.  Still, it is my department’s responsibility to plan for all  contingencies and to provide the president with a wide range of military  options should they become necessary.  
       That is a responsibility I take very seriously because when it comes to  the threat posed by Iran, the president has made it very clear that we  have not taken any options off the table…
        Iran  is isolating itself from the rest of the world.  It is truly becoming,  particularly as a result of the attack on the British Embassy, a pariah  in that region.  Their own government is off balance in terms of really  trying to establish any kind of stability even within Iran…  
[Question:] Mr. Secretary, how long do you believe a military attack on Iran would postpone it from getting a bomb? 
       At  best it might postpone it maybe one, possibly two years.  It depends on  the ability to truly get the targets that they’re after.  Frankly, some  of those targets are very difficult to get at.  
       That kind of, that kind of shot would only, I think, ultimately not  destroy their ability to produce an atomic weapon, but simply delay it –  number one.  Of greater concern to me are the unintended consequences,  which would be that ultimately it would have a backlash and the regime  that is weak now, a regime that is isolated would suddenly be able to  reestablish itself, suddenly be able to get support in the region, and  suddenly instead of being isolated would get the greater support in a  region that right now views it as a pariah.  
        Thirdly, the United States would obviously be blamed and we could  possibly be the target of retaliation from Iran, striking our ships,  striking our military bases.  Fourthly – there are economic consequences  to that attack – severe economic consequences that could impact a very  fragile economy in Europe and a fragile economy here in the United  States.  
        And lastly I think that the consequence could be that we would have an  escalation that would take place that would not only involve many lives,  but I think could consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a  conflict that we would regret.   So we have to be careful about the  unintended consequences of that kind of an attack… 
        In addition, once Iran gets a nuclear weapon, then they’re not – you  will have an arms race in the Middle East.  What’s to stop Saudi Arabia  from getting a nuclear weapon?  What’s to stop other countries from  getting nuclear weapons in that part of the world?  Suddenly we have an  escalation of these horrible weapons that, you know, I think create even  greater devastation in the Middle East.  
         So a key for all of us – for all of us is to work together – together –  to ensure that that does not happen.  We have made good progress in  these efforts.  We continue to make good progress in these efforts.   That’s where we ought to continue to put our pressures, our efforts, our  diplomatic, our economic, experts working together to make sure that  that does not happen.  
         You always have as a last resort – as the prime minister said – the  last resort of military action, but it must be the last resort, not the  first. 
[Question:]  Is the chief priority of U.S. policy toward Iran to moderate the  nuclear ambitions of the Iranian regime, or to change the Iranian  regime?  Will this regime be willing to change its behavior? 
         The  effort that we’re concerned about is to make sure that Iran does not  obtain a nuclear weapon, first.  Secondly, we would like to have an Iran  that becomes part of the international community and that it decides  that it is going to engage with the rest of the world, as opposed to  isolating itself, as opposed to supporting terrorists, as opposed to  trying to influence and support those that attack our country and attack  others in that region. 
